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Abstract The variety in the interpretation of imperatives has received different
accounts in the literature (Wilson & Sperber 1988; Han 2000; Schwager 2006;
Kaufmann 2012; Portner 2007; Grosz 2011; Condoravdi & Lauer 2012; von Fintel
& Iatridou To appear). In this paper, I argue that imperatives involve an existential
modal. I present evidence for the existential analysis of the imperative operator from
scopal ambiguities with only. The universal reading is explained on the basis of two
factors; i) lack of a scalar counterpart as opposed to overt modals (cf. Deal 2011) ii)
strengthening via an implicature derived in the presence of certain focus alternatives
(cf. Schwager 2005, 2006; Kaufmann 2012).
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1 Introduction
The variety of meanings found in imperatives has been a long-lasting puzzle in the
literature (Wilson & Sperber 1988; Han 2000; Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012;
Portner 2007; Grosz 2011; Condoravdi & Lauer 2012; von Fintel & Iatridou To
appear). The same imperative can get different interpretations depending on the
context. For example, an imperative like ‘Open the window.’ can be interpreted as
command/request uttered by a teacher when he enters the classroom, or as permission
in a context where it is generally prohibited to open the windows during the class
but the teacher provides permission after many students have asked for it.
The common strategy in the literature is to suggest an analysis that captures
the command/request interpretation (along with other readings which we will not
discuss here, e.g. plea, advice, threat, wish) (Schwager 2006; Portner 2007), and
introduce a special mechanism in order to derive permission readings.
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In this paper, I go the opposite way; I argue that imperatives are modalized
propositions (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012) which involve an existential modal
and therefore the permission interpretation is derived for free. The universal reading
is derived on the basis of two factors: i) lack of a stronger scalar counterpart as
opposed to overt modals (Deal 2011) and ii) strengthening via an implicature derived
in the presence of certain focus alternatives. Independent evidence for the existential
character of the operator in imperatives is provided by scope interactions of the
imperative operator with only.
The following section presents a brief overview of two different analyses of
imperatives which capture in different ways command vs. permission readings. In
Section 3, I introduce a different approach which treats imperatives as involving an
existential modal. In Section 4, I provide evidence for the existential character of
imperatives from scope ambiguities with only focusing on Greek. In Section 5, I
show how we can derive the strong reading as an implicature. Section 6 concludes
and posits some further questions.
2 Previous analyses of imperatives
In this section, I present how the different analyses explain the variety of interpre-
tations in imperatives focusing on the distinction between the permission and the
command/request interpretation. Broadly we can distinguish between two types of
approaches; the minimal approach according to which there is no modal operator
present in imperatives and the modal approach which assumes that there is a modal
operator in the semantics.
2.1 Minimal approach
The essence of the minimal approach is that there is no operator in the semantics of an
imperative clause (Portner 2004, 2007; Pak, Portner & Zanuttini 2008; Mastop 2005;
von Fintel & Iatridou To appear; Starr 2011; Roberts To appear). An imperative
clause denotes a property or a proposition. The ‘directive’ force of imperatives
comes from the pragmatics.
Portner (2004, 2007) suggests that the imperative is a different clause type along
with declaratives and interrogatives. Following the Stalnakerian notion of Common
Ground (CG), declaratives serve as updates of the information in the CG. Portner
suggests a parallel function for imperatives; imperatives add properties to another
stack dubbed To-Do List for each addressee (A). The denotation of the imperative
is just a property which holds of the addressee, as shown in (1) for an imperative
clause like ‘Open the window’.
(1) JOpen the windowK = λw. λx: x = Addresse. x opens the window in w
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Similarly to the way in which a declarative proposition adds its content to the
Common Ground (CG), and interrogatives to the Question Stack (Q), a successfully
uttered imperative adds its content to A’s To-Do List (T). The following formalization
is suggested in Portner 2007:
(2) Pragmatic Function of imperatives
a. The To-Do List function T assigns to each participant a in the conversation
a set of properties T(a)
b. The canonical discourse function of an imperative clause φ imp is to addJφ impK to T(addressee). Where C is a context of the form 〈CG, Q, T〉:
C + φimp =
〈
CG,Q,T[addressee/T(addressee)] ∪ Jφ impK〉
In addition, the To-Do List imposes an ordering on the worlds compatible with
the CG as shown in (3a). The Agent’s commitment principle in (3b) guarantees that
the addressee will try to fulfill as many properties as he can from his To-Do List.
(3) Ordering pragmatics for imperatives
a. Partial ordering of worlds: For any w1, w2 ∈ ∩ CG and any participant
i, w1 <i w2 iff for some P ∈ T(i), P(w2)(i) = 1 and P(w1)(i) = 0, and for
all Q ∈ T(i): if Q(w2)(i) = 1, then Q(w1)(i) = 1.
b. Agent’s commitment: For any participant i, the participants in the con-
versation mutually agree to deem i’s actions rational and cooperative to the
extent that those actions in any world w1 ∈ ∩ CG such that w1 <i w2.
Crucially, permission readings posit a problem for this analysis. Portner ac-
knowledges this problem and he suggests a special treatment of permissions in
Portner 2010. In a nutshell, the idea is that permission readings arise from conflict-
ing requirements on the To-do List (Portner 2010). Building on the general idea
that permissions arise “in the context of a countervailing prohibition” (Kamp 1979),
Portner argues that the context in which an imperative is interpreted as a permission
typically contains a prohibition. Permission readings arise in contexts in which
the updated To-Do List is inconsistent (e.g. take an apple / ¬ take an apple) and
therefore, there is no preference over the one or the other option (see Portner 2010).
A problem with this analysis, as noted in von Fintel & Iatridou To appear, is that
conflicting requirements do not always suggest that there is a possibility of choosing
among them. Portner (2010), himself, also acknowledges a similar problem in the
following example:
(4) Bring beer to the party tomorrow! Actually, bring wine!
The imperatives in (4) are inconsistent but they do not provide a real choice to the
addressee as to whether he brings wine or beer. In order to solve this problem, Portner
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suggests that an imperative can signal a choice among conflicting requirements only
when it is marked as permission. In other words the default is that imperatives
are interpreted as requirements but in some cases imperatives can be marked (by
intonation, or by an overt expression like if you want, or by a morpheme in some
languages) as permissions. However, as von Fintel & Iatridou (To appear) point out,
this mechanism abandons the core component of the minimal approach, that there
is no feature in semantics indicating permission or requirement (see von Fintel &
Iatridou To appear for discussion and a suggested amendment to Portner’s analysis).
Below I briefly outline Kaufmann’s proposal which is my point of departure for the
analysis I pursue.
2.2 Modal approach
The common thread in modal analyses of imperatives is that they incorporate a
modal operator into the semantics of an imperative clause (Han 2000; Schwager
2006; Kaufmann 2012; Grosz 2011; Condoravdi & Lauer 2012). Schwager (2006)/
Kaufmann (2012) argues that there is a universal modal operator whereas Grosz
(2011) argues in favor of an ambiguity analysis under which imperatives sometimes
involve a possibility and sometimes a necessity modal. Condoravdi & Lauer (2012)
develop a different analysis under which the operator in imperatives encodes effective
preferences. Here we focus mostly on Kaufmann’s analysis.
Kaufmann, in Schwager 2006 and Kaufmann 2012, analyses the imperative
operator as a universal modal. Under this approach the meaning of an imperative is
identical to that of a proposition containing a universal modal as shown in (5):
(5) JOpen the windowKw = ∀w′ ∈ ∩f(w) [A opens the window in w′]
The fact that there is a modal operator in the semantics allows Kaufmann to
use the machinery introduced by Kratzer (1981) in order to account for the variety
of interpretations in imperatives. Roughly, by employing different conversational
backgrounds for the ordering source, Kaufmann derives wishes (g = what the
speaker wants), requests/commands (g = what the speaker orders) and advice (g
= A’s preferences, or what is considered to be generally preferred) (see Kaufmann
2012, Section 4.1). However, permission and acquiescence readings once more
present a puzzle because it is not a matter of a variable ordering source but of weaker
force.
Particularly puzzling for Kaufmann are what she calls for-example imperatives
such as the example in (6) which can be an answer to a question like ‘How could I
save money?’
(6) Stop buying cigarettes for example! For example-Advice
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For cases like this, Kaufmann suggests that the universal modal should be
reduced to an existential one. The mechanism she suggests is of particular interest
for the analysis I pursue here because, in some sense, it provides a mirror picture
of the mechanism I propose. Kaufmann analyses examples like (6) as inexhaustive
possibilities. This means that she considers the default imperative as an instance of
exhaustive possibility. Below is an example of hers with an overt existential modal
that intuitively constitutes an instance of an exhaustive possibility:
(7) A. What could I possibly do to stop smoking?
B. The only thing you can do is stop buying cigarettes.
Building on Zimmermann 2000, Kaufmann shows that an exhaustified possibility
amounts to a necessity. Under this idea, an imperative is treated as a possibility
which is obligatorily exhaustified thus being equivalent to a necessity:
(8) EXH() = λb.λp. (b)(p) & (∀q ∈ (b))[q ∈ (p)] = 
(Kaufmann 2012: 185)
Kaufmann (2012) treats the EXH-operator as being part of the semantics, modi-
fying the modal operator. The question is then what blocks exhaustification in the
for-example uses in which we get a possibility reading. She argues that expres-
sions like for-example act as anti-exhaustifiers, thus removing the EXH-operator
and licensing a possibility reading. As Kaufmann herself points out the nature of
this exhaustive operator as well as the conditions under which anti-exhaustification
occurs require further investigation.
The idea I pursue here is, in fact, very similar to Kaufmann’s idea of exhaustified
possibilities. The difference lies in that I take this exhaustification operator to be the
result of the general mechanism in the generation of implicatures in the presence
of alternatives. Under this view, exhaustification will apply when there are certain
alternatives which depend on the focus-marking. I start off with a possibility modal
to explain permission readings and then I show how exhaustification applies to derive
the stronger command, request readings.
3 An existential analysis of imperatives
The analysis I pursue here can be classified under the modal approaches, since I
argue that there is a modal operator in the semantics. Unlike Kaufmann however, I
analyse the imperative operator (Imp) as an existential modal.
For the purposes of this paper it suffices to assume that the imperative operator
is a bouletic (relativized with respect to the speaker’s desires) modal operator with
the bouletic component hardwired into its meaning. In particular, the denotation
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of Imp is evaluated with respect to a world w (type s) and a context c, which is a
tuple containing the speaker and the addressee (c:〈S,A〉). Imp takes as its argument
a proposition q of type 〈st〉 and it states that there is a world w’ compatible with
Speaker’s desires in w and q is true in world w’. In other words, (9) says that q is
consistent with the speaker’s desires.
(9) JImpKw,c = λq ∈ D〈st〉. ∃w′∈W such that Sc’s desires in w with respect to
the Ac’s actions are satisfied in w′ & q(w′) = 1
The idea that the flavor of the imperative operator is bouletic, about the speaker’s
desires, is not new (see Wilson & Sperber 1988) and it is more recently developed
by Condoravdi & Lauer who analyse imperatives as involving an operator encoding
effective preferences.
The crucial question that any modal approach to imperatives faces is how we get
from the meaning in (9) to the performative character of imperatives. In other words,
how do we explain the fact that imperatives cannot be challenged as lies? Kaufmann,
in a series of works (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012, 2016), develops an account
of the performativity of imperatives arguing that the modal operator is restricted
by certain presuppositions to occur only in contexts which derive a performative
interpretation. I will not elaborate more on this part here as it is not directly relevant
to the point I want to make regarding the existential quantificational force but I will
assume that Kaufmann’s account of performativity can be extended to the present
analysis.
That said, the meaning for an Imperative like ‘Open the window!’ is provided in
(10):
(10) JOpen the windowKw,c = ∃w′∈W. Sc’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ Ac
opens the window in w′
Whereas this meaning can capture permission readings without any additional
assumptions, it cannot account as such for commands/requests, which are usually
considered to be the default readings of imperatives.1 Before proceeding to an
1 A major argument against an existential approach to imperatives is the ban on the conjunction of
conflicting imperatives (von Fintel & Iatridou To appear: 71):
(11) a. #Go left and go right! I don’t care.
b. You could go left and you could go right. I don’t care.
c. Go left. Go right! I don’t care.
While an existential analysis accounts for (11c), the data in (11a) remain problematic in view
of the well-formedness of (11b). Notice that the data are also problematic for a universal approach,
since conjunction of two conflicting requirement is in principle possible (e.g. I want you to leave
and I want you to stay.). I believe that the infelicity of 11a is due to the performative character of
imperatives and not due to their quantificational force. Further investigation of performatives is
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account for these cases in Section 5, I provide evidence for the existential character
of the modal in the next section.
4 Evidence for the existential character of imperatives from scope ambigui-
ties
Haida & Repp (2012) observe that an Imperative containing only as in (12) is
ambiguous; in context A, we get the reading that it’s O.K. to not paint the other
tables whereas in context B, we get the reading that it’s O.K. to paint the round table
but it’s not O.K. to paint the other tables:
Context A Context B
You’ve asked me to paint those tables
but I’m really tired and don’t feel like
doing something really useful today.
Oh, I feel like doing something really
useful today. I think I’ll paint the tables
over there.
(12) Only paint the round table.
(Haida & Repp 2012: 308)
I argue that the ambiguity in (12) is best explained as a scopal ambiguity.2
Evidence for this comes from Modern Greek, where overt focus movement is shown
to resolve scope ambiguities. Building on the Greek data with movement, I argue
that the ambiguity can be explained only if we treat the imperative modal operator as
an existential modal. As I show below, imperatives behave just like overt existential
modals with respect to scope ambiguities with only.
4.1 Evidence from overt movement in Greek
Overt focus movement in Greek seems to resolve scopal ambiguities in general
(cf. Tsimpli 1995, Gryllia 2009). What is of special interest here is the way in
which focus movement can affect scope relations between the focused constituent
and quantifiers in the sentence. Baltazani (2002) shows that focus is relevant for
the scope readings we get, showing that in general a focused constituent takes
wide scope. However, she does not discuss cases where the focused constituent is
associated with a focus operator like only. Here we are dealing with these cases,
showing that overt movement of the only-phrase results in wide scope of only.
necessary in order to understand the data in (11). See Oikonomou (2016) for a discussion.
2 Haida & Repp (2012) do not consider this to be a scopal ambiguity. The purpose of their paper is
to evaluate Portner’s and Schwager’s account for imperatives in view of what they predict for the
particular example. Notice, however, that in footnote (1) Haida & Repp mention the possibility for
the ambiguity to be scopal.
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Consider the following pairs with the overt existential modal in Greek, boris
‘can’, embedded under the same contexts A&B introduced by Haida & Repp (2012).
When only appears with its associate in-situ (13a), the sentence is ambiguous and
therefore it is felicitous under both contexts.3 When the only-phrase is preverbal
(13b) only the wide scope (only > can) survives and therefore the sentence is good
only under context B. The sentence can only mean that the only table that the
addressee is allowed to paint is the round one (e.g. it’s not O.K. to paint the other
tables).
(13) a. Boris
can.2SG
na
SUBJ
vapsis
paint.2SG
[mono
only
to
the
strogilo
round
trapezi].
table.
‘You can paint only the round table’
→ OK in Context A:  > only
→ OK in Context B: only > 
b. [mono
Only
to
the
strogilo
round
trapezi]
table
boris
can.2SG
na
SUBJ
vapsis.
paint.2SG
‘The only table you can paint is the round one.’
→ Bad in Context A: * > only
→ OK in Context B: only > 
The imperative operator interacts with only exactly in the same way that an
existential modal does. In (14a), when the only-DP remains in situ, both the narrow-
scope (Imp > only ) and the wide-scope (only > Imp) reading is available. This
is shown by the fact that (14a) is good under both contexts, just like the English
example in (12). On the contrary, in (14b) where the only-DP undergoes focus
movement only the wide-scope reading where only takes scope above the imperative
operator survives. As we can see, (14b) is felicitous only in Context B yielding the
interpretation that A is not allowed to paint the other tables:
Context A Context B
You’ve asked me to paint those tables
but I’m really tired and don’t feel like
doing something really useful today.
Oh, I feel like doing something really
useful today. I think I’ll paint the tables
over there.
(14) a. Vapse
Paint
[mono
only
to
the
strogilo
round
trapezi].
table.
→ OK in Context A:  > only
→ OK in Context B: only > 
3 See Crnicˇ (2013) for independent evidence for the availability of inverse scope of only with modal
operators.
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b. [mono
Only
to
the
strogilo
round
trapezi]
table
vapse.
paint.
→ Bad in Context A: * > only
→ OK in Context B: only > 
The scope ambiguity is not specific to the interaction with only, it is also attested
with degree quantifiers such as few, fewer than.4 (15a) in which few surfaces in-situ
is felicitous in both Contexts A & B, whereas (15b), where few has undergone overt
movement, is only compatible with Context B. When few is interpreted below Imp,
the interpretation is that A is allowed to paint few tables (and it is O.K. to not paint
all of them) whereas when few takes wide scope the interpretation is that there are
few tables that the A is allowed to paint (the rest of them he is not allowed to paint):
(15) a. Vapse
Paint
liga
few
trapezia!
tables
→ OK in Context A:  > only
→ OK in Context B: only > 
b. Liga
few
trapezia
tables
vapse!
paint
→ Bad in Context A: * > few
→ OK in Context B: few > 
In the following, I show that the scope ambiguity can be derived assuming that
the imperative operator has existential as opposed to universal force, which derives
the wrong meaning. If there is no operator at all, it becomes impossible to account
for the scope interaction with overt movement.
4.2 Deriving the scope ambiguity
For the purposes of the discussion here, I follow a version of Horn’s (2011) analy-
sis of only as a presupposition trigger; only takes as its argument a proposition p,
presupposes that p is true and asserts the negation of all alternatives of p. Follow-
ing Rooth (1992), the alternatives of p are computed by substituting the focused
constituent ROUND with the relevant alternatives (i.e. SQUARE/TRIANGLE). Given
these assumptions, when only has narrow scope, it will attach to the prejacent (below
the modal operator) yielding the LF in (16a) and the corresponding alternatives (A
paints the round/square/triangle table). When only has wide-scope, it merges above
the modal operator, deriving the LF in (16b) and the alternatives that ∃w′∈W. S’s
desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ A paints the ROUND/SQUARE/TRIANGLE table in
w′:
4 Thanks to a SALT reviewer and to Irene Heim for pointing out the relevance of these data.
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(16) a. LF( > only): [imp [[only(C) roundF table ] [λx [you paint x]]]]
b. LF(only > ): [only(C) roundF table] [λx [imp [you paint x]]]
Based on this, when only is interpreted below the existential modal (Context A),
we get the meaning in (17a) that there is a world consistent with S’s desires and A
doesn’t paint the square/triangle table in this world. When only takes scope above
the existential modal (Context B), we get the interpretation in (17b) that there is no
world consistent with S’s desires in which A paints the square/triangle table:
(17) a. ∃w′∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ ¬ [A paints the SQR/TRG
table in w′]
→ A is allowed to not paint the other tables.
b. ¬ ∃w′ ∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ A paints the SQR/TRG
table in w′
→ A is not allowed to paint the other tables.
The data from Greek show that when the only-DP overtly moves, we get a wide
scope reading and the interpretation derived can only be explained if there is a covert
existential operator. As I show below, a universal or an ambiguous analysis of the
imperative operator cannot account for the data presented.
4.3 Scope facts under a universal analysis of Imp
Under a universal analysis of the modal operator, we can derive the expected inter-
pretation for the examples in which only is in-situ, but we derive the wrong reading
for the examples in which the quantifier moves overtly. When only surfaces in-situ
both readings are licensed for context A & B as shown in (18):
(18) Vapse
Paint
mono
only
to
the
strogilo
round
trapezi!
table
→  > only: A is required not to paint the other tables.
→ only > : A is not required to paint the other tables.
When the only-phrase moves only wide scope (only > ) is expected to survive.
However, this would predict the wrong interpretation under Context B (Oh, I feel
like doing something really useful today. I think I’ll paint the tables over there.),
because we derive the interpretation that that A is not required to paint the other
tables, whereas the desired interpretation is that A is required to not paint the other
tables.
Similarly, under an ambiguous analysis of imperatives (Grosz 2011), we would
expect two possible readings for the example with overt focus movement:
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(19) [mono
Only
to
the
strogilo
round
trapezi]
table
vapse!
paint!
→ only > : A is not required to paint the other tables.
→ only > : A is not required to paint the other tables.
The absence of the reading in which only has wide scope above a universal modal
suggests that the modal can only have an existential interpretation here. Unless there
is some strange condition under which overt movement blocks the universal reading,
it is hard to explain the interpretation of (19) assuming an ambiguity analysis.
4.4 Scope facts under a minimal approach
Under the minimal approach in which there is no operator in the semantics, it
is not possible to explain the facts as a scope ambiguity. Haida & Repp (2012)
attempt to explain the ambiguity of the English data not as a scope ambiguity but
as an ambiguity which arises by the imperative being interpreted as command or
permission. However, the Greek data show that the ambiguity is scopal in nature.
The only solution would be to postulate a speech act operator (something that
would be closer to Portner’s approach but still an operator in the semantics). In this
case however, it is under question whether only could scope as high as a speech
act operator (see Krifka 2001 for which operators can scope above a speech act
operator).
To summarize, the scope facts in Greek, where overt focus movement resolves
scope ambiguities, provide solid evidence in favor of a covert existential modal in
imperatives and against a universal or a minimal approach. The existential approach
not only handles permission readings without any additional assumptions but it is
also independently motivated by the observed scopal ambiguities. The main question
is how the strong readings (command, request) are derived, which I address in the
next section.
5 Deriving the strong-reading
It is clear that a possibility modal does not capture the imperative meanings in (20):
(20) a. Translate this document! Command
b. Give me some chocolate! Plea
c. Open the door, please! Request
d. Be at home! Wish
The idea I pursue here is that in all of these imperative clauses there is an
existential modal which is strengthened to a universal modal. Below I discuss the
conditions under which strengthening happens.
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5.1 Conditions for strengthening
5.1.1 Condition I: Lack of a stronger scalar counterpart
First, for a stronger interpretation to arise, a necessary condition is that this interpre-
tation is not blocked. We know for example, that overt possibility modals cannot be
strengthened. The sentence in (21) cannot mean ‘You must open the door.’
(21) You can open the door.
This is explained as a conversational scalar implicature which is derived con-
sidering the fact that the Speaker didn’t use the stronger scalar counterpart to the
existential modal, the universal modal must.5 The exact mechanism for the derivation
of the implicature varies depending on the theory one favors. For now, it is not impor-
tant whether one favors a pragmatic (neo-Gricean approach: Spector 2007; van Rooij
& Schulz 2004; Sauerland 2004; Chemla 2008) or a grammatical (Chierchia 2006,
2013; Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2009, 2012; Fox 2007) view for the derivation of
scalar implicatures. For ease of exposition, I will stick to the grammatical approach
as outlined in Chierchia et al. 2009.
Under this approach, there is an Exhaustivity operator (EXH) that negates the
alternatives and is responsible for the generation of the implicature. The EXH-
operator states that the proposition S is true and that the only members of the set of
alternatives (ALT) that are true are those entailed by S (Chierchia et al. 2009: 4).
The formal definition is given in (22):
(22) JEXHALT (S)Kw = 1 iff JSKw = 1 and ∀φ ∈ ALT(φ (w)) = 1→ (JSK ⊆ φ )
The alternatives in the case of the example in (21) will be the propositions
derived by substituting can with its horn-scalemate must. By applying EXH to the
alternatives, we derive the implicature that it’s not the case that A must open the
window.
Now the question is why imperatives don’t give rise to a similar implicature, since
we analysed them as possibility modals. I propose that no such implicature arises
because the imperative operator does not have a stronger scalar counterpart in
the first place. The idea that there are existential operators which lack a stronger
scalemate is not a new one. In the domain of modality, Deal (2011) suggests that
modal suffixes in Nez Perce are existential in character but they are not part of the
Horn scale, they don’t have a stronger counterpart. According to Deal (2011) the
5 In some specific contexts such as a queen-servant-context in which a queen tells her servant ‘You
may leave now’, the utterance can be understood as a command rather than permission. Given the
exceptional character of these environments, they will not concern us here. For all the other cases
with overt possibility modals, I will assume that the scalar implicature is always present, therefore
blocking a stronger interpretation.
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absence of an implicature is a key-point in explaining why these suffixes can be
used in contexts where a universal modal could appear. This idea gains ground
in explaining other instances of quantifiers with apparently ambiguous force. For
example, Bowler (2014) argues that in Walpiri there is a disjunction operator which
lacks a conjunction counterpart and therefore, in some environments, it can be
strengthened to a conjunction operator. Bar-Lev & Margulis (2014) argue that a
quantifier kol in Hebrew is existential in nature but it lacks a stronger counterpart
and therefore it can be interpreted as universal. A similar idea is employed by Bassi
& Bar-Lev (2016) in order to explain the mixed behavior of bare conditionals. The
idea I employ here is essentially the same, the imperative operator does not have a
stronger scalar counterpart and therefore we can get a stronger interpretation.
5.1.2 Condition II: Exhaustifying over focus alternatives
The next step is to explain what forces the necessity reading. I argue that strength-
ening is the result of an implicature derived by exhaustifying over certain focus
alternatives. The command/request readings are derived when the alternatives in-
volve the negation of the prejacent (p), (¬p). I argue that this happens when the
prejacant is broadly focused.
Following Rooth (1992), the alternatives of p can be any proposition of type
〈st〉. When an imperative (imp p) is uttered in an out-of-the-blue context I take the
only contextually salient proposition to be the negation of p, (¬p), thus deriving the
alternatives in (24) for the imperative in (23):
(23) Open the window!
(24) J(23)K f ,w ={
∃w′ ∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ A opens wnd in w′
∃w′∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ ¬[A opens wnd in w′]
}
The focus alternatives are then evaluated by the EXH-operator, introduced above,
and all non-weaker alternatives are negated, thus deriving the implicature in (25):
(25) ¬∃w′ ∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ ¬[A opens wnd in w′]
By exhaustifying the alternatives we get the interpretation that there is no world
compatible with S’s desires in which A does not open the window. This is equivalent
to saying that A must open the window, thus capturing the strong-reading of the
imperatives when they are intended as commands, requests, etc. The reader can
see now how this analysis presents the mirror picture of the analysis presented in
Kaufmann 2012. For her, the imperative operator is a universal modal composed from
an existential modal and an Exhaustive operator (EXH). In some specific contexts
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(for-example-advice) EXH is removed and therefore, a possibility reading arises. In
the present analysis, imperatives involve just a possibility modal. Exhaustification
applies in certain environments upon the emergence of focus alternatives.
The critical question that we have to address under the present analysis is
how a negated (and therefore more complex) form is licensed as an alternative.
Under Rooth’s mechanism for the derivation of the alternatives, we would expect
any proposition of type 〈st〉 to be a vital alternative to p. This means that when
a speaker utters an imperative such as ‘Open the window!’ we could derive an
infinite set of alternatives including ‘Play the guitar.’, ‘Swim.’, etc. Indeed, when the
context provides a relevant set of possibilities then EXH can exhaustify over these
possibilities, as suggested in Kaufmann 2012. For example, imagine a context in
which an entrepreneur is faced with bankruptcy and he has three ways in which he
can avoid this; selling his house, getting a new loan or marry his main opponent. In
this context, his father utters the Imperative in (26):
(26) Marry your opponent.
In this context, we should definitely consider ‘sell the house’ and ‘get a new
loan’ as vital alternatives which will be exhaustified, deriving the interpretation that
there is no world compatible with the Speaker’s desires in which the addressee sells
his house or gets a new loan. In this case, we don’t even need the negated alternative
¬marry your opponent. But what about cases, in which an imperative is uttered in
an out-of-the-blue context? What if the context provides no other possibilities?
In cases in which an imperative is uttered without any relevant preceding context,
it seems that we want the only relevant alternative to be the negation of the prejacent
and not to exhaustify blindly over an infinite set of possibilities to derive a strong
interpretation. Consider, for example, a case in which a mother returns from work
and she says to her kids ‘By tomorrow clean your rooms.’ By uttering this, the
mother doesn’t exclude other things that the kids are allowed to do, she only tells
them that it’s necessary to clean their rooms. This can be captured if we take the
alternative to be derived by substituting the prejacent with its negation. So far, so
good, but although the claim that the alternative is derived by substituting p with its
negation is compatible with Rooth’s original analysis, it runs into problems when
we consider the broader picture of alternatives computation.
Fox & Katzir (2011) suggest a theory for the Computation of Alternatives which
does not allow alternatives which are structurally more complex than their prejacent.
Clearly, the negation of a proposition p is structurally more complex than p. Fox
& Katzir’s analysis provides a solution to a more general problem, the symmetry
problem in the computation of implicatures and therefore we don’t want to discard
their theory. However, there is a way out of this problem. In the definition for the
calculation of alternatives, Fox & Katzir allow more complex alternatives as long as
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they are imposed by the context as relevant alternatives. I argue that the negation of
a proposition p is always a contextual salient alternative when p is broadly focused.
This not only allows us to derive the right meaning for strong imperatives but it
also captures the intuition that, in some cases, an imperative expresses a preference
between p and ¬p (cf. Condoravdi & Lauer 2012; Starr 2011).
5.2 The role of prosody
The claim that strengthening depends on focus alternatives predicts that the prosodic
pattern of an imperative clause is directly associated with the reading that we get.
Indeed, this is a broader claim put forward by the present analysis. Although, the
space is limited to set up such an analysis here, let me at least provide some cues
that indeed focus (F-)marking becomes relevant for the interpretation of imperatives.
Firstly, I assumed in the previous section that a strengthened meaning arises
when an imperative is broadly focused. Broad focus in imperatives, similarly to
declaratives, is marked with a Nuclear Pitch Accent (NPA) on the right-edge of the
utterance. This predicts that an imperative which has a distinct prosodic pattern
(i.e. narrow focus on some non-final constituent) will not give rise to a strong
interpretation. I will discuss here two different cases, one in which the NPA falls on
the verb and one in which the NPA falls on a different constituent (narrow focus). I
show that in these cases we do not derive a strengthened interpretation at least not
the same as in the case of broad focus, suggesting that F-marking plays indeed a
significant role in the interpretation of imperatives.
5.2.1 NPA on the verb→ permission readings
In the above contexts, command and permission readings are associated each with a
distinct prosodic pattern. Commands/requests are realized with broad focus intona-
tion (the NPA falls on the rightmost constituent) whereas in permission contexts the
NPA falls on the verb. NPA accent on the verb is compatible with many possibilities
regarding F-marking. For example, we could assume that the verb itself is focused,
deriving lexical alternatives such as open, close, etc. However, in the permission
contexts this is not the case, normally the VP is already given. Consider the fol-
lowing example in which the imperative is uttered in a context which foregrounds
permission:
(27) Context:The rules of the school require that during the class the window
remains closed. However, today the kids feel very hot and they ask their
teacher to open the window. Then the teacher responds back saying:
O.K. Open the window. But it’s your responsibility.
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In this context, the natural way to utter the imperative is with the NPA on the
verb followed by de-accenting. I take these cases to be an instance of verum focus,
with the covert imperative operator being F-marked. The alternatives derived by
focusing the covert operator in an imperative clause like ‘Open the window.’ will
be its negation (verum focus), as shown in (28), therefore no implicature is derived,
because the alternative contradicts the assertion.
(28) J(23)K f ,w ={
∃w′ ∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ A opens wnd in w′
¬∃w′∈W. S’s desires in w are satisfied in w′ ∧ A opens wnd in w′
}
The meaning we get is that there is a world compatible with the Speaker’s desires
in which the addressee opens the window, and no additional implicature is derived
which captures our intuition about the weak interpretation of the imperative in this
context. Much more is to be said about such cases as well as the role of the context,
the interaction between F-marking and givenness but for the sake of space I will not
expand here (see Oikonomou 2016). What is important for the scope of the present
paper is that a permission reading is indeed associated with a distinct prosodic pattern
from the one we find in commands/requests, supporting the idea that a strengthened
meaning arises by exhaustifying over focus alternatives. In the following, we discuss
cases with narrow focus on a constituent which generate a different implicature, one
that doesn’t entail necessity.
5.2.2 Narrow-focus imperatives
Another possibility is to have narrow focus on a constituent. In this case under
the present analysis, we will derive the interpretation that p is compatible with S’s
desires and that an alternative derived by substituting the focused constituent is
not. For example, the imperative in (29) with narrow focus on vanilla provides
permission to the kid to eat vanilla ice-cream but it also conveys a prohibition against
eating other ice-cream flavors (e.g. chocolate ice-cream):
(29) Context: Child is asking for ice-cream at 10p.m. His mother desperate says:
O.k. . . Eat VANILLA ice-cream!. . . Although, you shouldn’t eat any ice-
cream.
→ You are not allowed to eat chocolate/brownie/strawberry ice-cream etc.
Of course, narrow focus is also compatible in contexts in which the prejacent is
not only taken to be possible but also necessary. For example, in (30) it is already
established that a window must be opened and the imperative clause conveys that A
can open the front window but not the back window.
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(30) Context: It stinks in here.. You should open a window. . .
Open the FRONT window!
→ You are not allowed to open the back window, etc.
The necessity interpretation in (30) is not problematic for the present analysis
because the request/command is already established in the context.
Overall, the present analysis predicts that there is a mapping between the prosodic
pattern and the interpretation of the imperative (if not one-to-one correspondence,
there is at least differentiation between commands and permissions). Further types
of imperatives like advice or wishes should be examined in order to gain a better
understanding for the way in which prosody can provide cues for the interpretation
of imperatives.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I presented an analysis of imperatives as existential modals. I showed
that in this way we can account for free for permission readings as opposed to
analyses which relate the imperative with a universal modal or with a function that
updates the context. Moreover, I showed that an existential analysis is independently
motivated by the scope facts presented in Section 4. However, an existential analysis
faces the question of how strong meanings of imperatives are derived.
I showed that a command/request interpretation can be derived by the strength-
ening mechanism we use in computing conversational implicatures. The input to
this mechanism is the set of focus alternatives. Of course, we could also imagine
different ways of deriving the strengthened interpretation. Another possibility would
be to apply exhaustification over domain alternatives as suggested in Bassi & Bar-
Lev 2016 for conditionals and Bar-Lev & Margulis 2014 for the quantifier kol in
Hebrew. However, a strong motivation for deriving the strengthened interpretation
by exhaustifying over focus alternatives is that the focus placement appears to be
tightly connected to the interpretation of imperatives as we discussed briefly in the
previous section. Abandoning the idea of focus alternatives would force us to think
of a different way in order to account for the correlation between the prosody and
the meaning.
An ultimate question arising from this analysis is whether there is a principled
explanation for the existential character of imperatives. Relatedly, we observe
that similar constructions to imperatives like root subjunctives in Greek and other
languages are also ambiguous between permission and command readings. One idea
worth exploring would be to see whether generally covert modals are existential
modals which can be strengthened to convey necessity. Notice that conditionals
have also been analysed as existential in recent works (Herburger 2015; Bassi &
Bar-Lev 2016). If this is true then maybe we can have a generalization regarding the
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existential character of covert modals.
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